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ABSTRACT
With the growing use of location-based services, location privacy
attracts increasing attention from users, industry, and the research
community. While considerable effort has been devoted to invent-
ing techniques that prevent service providers from knowing a user’s
exact location, relatively little attention has been paid to enabling
so-called peer-wise privacy—the protection of a user’s location from
unauthorized peer users. This paper identifies an important effi-
ciency problem in existing peer-privacy approaches that simply ap-
ply a filtering step to identify users that are located in a query range,
but that do not want to disclose their location to the querying peer.
To solve this problem, we propose a novel, privacy-policy enabled
index called the PEB-tree that seamlessly integrates location prox-
imity and policy compatibility. We propose efficient algorithms
that use the PEB-tree for processing privacy-aware range and kNN
queries. Extensive experiments suggest that the PEB-tree enables
efficient query processing.
1. INTRODUCTION
We are experiencing an increasing availability of location-based
services such as AT&T’s TeleNav GPS Navigator, Sprint’s Fam-
ily Locator, and Intel’s Thing Finder. A key obstacle to the broad
adoption of location-based services is the lack of location privacy
protection [2, 20, 30].
Specifically, in a setting where a service provider serves mul-
tiple users, a user may have privacy concerns with respect to the
service provider as well as the other service users. As an exam-
ple of the first case, a user may worry that the service provider
will disclose the user’s locations (e.g., the user’s daily route) to
malicious parties. We use provider-wise privacy for privacy in re-
lation to the service provider. As an example of the second case, an
employee may not want work colleagues to know his/her location
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during lunch if he/she is outside the company building. This type
of access restriction may also prevent stalking or other personal
security threats [24, 34]. We use peer-wise privacy for privacy in
relation to peer users.
Most research on location privacy thus far has been devoted to
provider-wise privacy, and techniques such as spatial cloaking [10,
36], location distortion [18], and encryption [9] have been explored.
In relation to peer-wise privacy, only a simple filtering approach has
been employed.
The setting of the filtering approach is one where users specify
their privacy preferences using location privacy policies that cap-
ture who is allowed to see the location of who and under what con-
ditions. To answer a peer-wise privacy-aware query, the filtering
approach first finds users who satisfy the query’s location require-
ments in the same way as is done for privacy unaware location-
based queries, i.e., using existing moving object indexing and query-
ing techniques. Only then it filters out users by inspecting their
location privacy policies.
For example, if a user issues a query for other nearby service
users, the service provider not only needs to find nearby users; it
also needs to check the privacy policies of the users found to en-
sure that they are willing to disclose their locations to the querying
user. When potential query results are found solely according to
spatial proximity, which is well supported by existing indexing and
query processing techniques, very large and unnecessary interme-
diate results may occur because the policy checking may eliminate
most of the results. Section 3 further elaborates on the problem.
This paper aims to provide an indexing technique and accom-
panying query processing algorithms that enable the efficient pro-
cessing of peer-wise privacy aware queries that serve as the founda-
tion for typical location-based services. Our proposed approach is
orthogonal to existing approaches to supporting provider-wise pri-
vacy and can be integrated with these to achieve additional privacy.
In particular, we propose the so-called Policy-Embedded Bx-tree
(PEB-tree), which organizes objects based on both spatial proxim-
ity and privacy policy compatibility. The main idea is to generate
an indexing key value for each object that encodes location as well
as policy information. This way, objects spatially near each other
and with compatible privacy policies are assigned similar keys and
are placed near each other in the index. The PEB-tree is based on
the widely implemented B+-tree, which promises easy integration
into existing commercial database systems. Based on the PEB-tree,
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we provide algorithms for processing privacy-aware range and k
nearest neighbor (kNN) queries.
The results of extensive empirical studies with the proposals sug-
gest that the PEB-tree based algorithms outperform existing tech-
niques considerably in terms of I/O cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
related work. Section 3 gives problem definitions, and Section 4
describes the existing approach used for comparison. Section 5
presents the proposed policy-embedded indexing techniques along
with a cost analysis. Then Sections 6 and 7 cover cost modeling and
empirical performance studies, respectively. Section 8 concludes
and outlines future research directions.
2. RELATED WORK
As the PEB-tree integrates moving-object location and privacy,
we first discuss research in moving-object database management
and then location privacy. After that, we review works that share
concepts that underlie our work.
2.1 Indexing and Querying Moving Objects
Previous Indexing Approaches
Moving object indexing must contend with frequent updates. Thus,
focus is often on the efficient support for workloads that contain
queries as well very frequent updates, which contrasts earlier works
on spatial indexing where the data was assumed to be relatively
static and focus was on query performance.
Most recent indexing proposals fall into one of three main cat-
egories: (i) R-tree-based indexes, such as the RUM-tree [35], the
TPR-tree [27], and the TPR*-tree [31]; (ii) B+-tree-based indexes,
such as the Bx-tree [13] and the Bdual-tree [32]; and (iii) quad-
tree-based indexes, such as STRIPES [25]. A benchmark study [3]
finds that the TPR-tree, the Bx-tree, and STRIPES perform best
under different workloads. However, these indexes focus on spatial
proximity and offer no provisions for supporting privacy.
Two recent indexing proposals [4, 17] take into account both lo-
cation proximity and text similarity for finding the top-k most rel-
evant spatial web objects. In particular, these leverage the inverted
file for text similarity retrieval and the R-tree for spatial proximity
querying. The PEB-tree also considers two aspects of the data it
indexes, but it tackles a very different problem, privacy-concerned
location-based queries.
Following other research in moving object databases [13, 27, 31,
32], we represent the position of a moving object as a linear func-
tion from time to point locations in two-dimensional Euclidean
space: −→x (t) = −→x + −→v (t − tu), where −→x and −→v are the two-
dimensional position and velocity of the object at time tu, and tu is
the time of the most recent update. An object is thus given by the
triple (−→x ,−→v , tu).
An object issues a location update to the server when the devi-
ation between its actual location and the predicted location based
on its moving function exceeds a given threshold. Objects are re-
quired to issue an update at least once within a maximum update
time ∆tmu in order to keep the server informed about their exis-
tence.
We proceed to describe the Bx-tree that serves as the base struc-
ture of the PEB-tree.
The Bx-Tree
The Bx-tree is an efficient and practical moving object index [3]
that exploits the B+-tree, which renders it amenable to implemen-
tation in real database systems. To exploit the B+-tree, the Bx-tree
update
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Figure 1: Updates in the Bx-Tree
transforms the linear functions that capture object movements into
single-dimensional values by means of a space-filling curve (e.g.,
the Z-curve) that is proximity preserving in the sense that points
close to one another in 2-dimensional space tend to be close to one
another in the transformed 1-dimensional space.
To differentiate locations inserted at different times, the Bx-tree
partitions the time axis into intervals of duration ∆tmu/n, where
∆tmu is the maximum update interval and n is a chosen number of
sub-partitions within ∆tmu. Each partition has a label timestamp
as shown in Figure 1. An update that occurs during some time
interval is performed as of the nearest future label timestamp tlab.
This way, objects are assigned to different partitions of the time
axis.
An object O = (−→x ,−→v , tu) , is then indexed as of tlab = ⌈tu +
tmu/n⌉l, where ⌈x⌉l denotes the nearest later label timestamp of
x. The value that is indexed, the Bxvalue , is the concatenation
(⊕) of the binary values ([·]2) of two components: the index parti-
tion, computed from the label timestamp (Equation 2); and x rep ,
computed from the object location as of the label timestamp (Equa-
tion 3).
Bxvalue(O, tu) = [index partition ]2 ⊕ [x rep]2 (1)
index partition = (tlab/(∆tmu/n) − 1)mod (n+ 1)(2)
x rep = x value(−→x +−→v · (tlab − tu)) (3)
For example, let the time axis be partitioned into intervals of dura-
tion ∆tmu/2. Objects updated between time 0 and ∆tmu/2 are in-
dexed as of the time tlab = ∆tmu. The resulting index partition
is 1 or ’01’ in binary format. Next, is the location as of tlab con-
verted to a single-dimensional value using a space-filling curve.
The Bx-tree inherits the B+-tree’s efficiency of insertions and dele-
tions.
To process range queries using the Bx-tree, the query ranges
need to be transformed to account for data transformation. Specif-
ically, query ranges need to be enlarged to ensure that all objects
that may be in the results are found.
Figure 2 shows an example where a solid rectangleR is the query
range at time 6 and black points are the locations of objects A,
B, and C as of time 5. Objects A and B will be in R at time
6 according to their velocity vectors. To ensure that all objects are
found, R is expanded toR′ using the maximum object speeds along
the two axes. For example, since the maximum downward speed is
2, the distance between the upper border of R and R′ is obtained by
multiplying this speed by the time difference, i.e., 2× (6−5) = 2.
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Figure 2: Range Query in the Bx-Tree
The enlargement guarantees that objects that may be in the result
are found.
The enlarged query range is then converted into intervals of con-
secutive space-filling curve values. As a result, a sequence of range
queries are issued to the Bx-tree. The objects found are then checked
for inclusion in a refinement step by using their actual locations at
the query time.
The Bx-tree can also process predictive k nearest neighbor (kNN)
queries. To do that, a range query based on an estimated kNN dis-
tance is issued first; then the range is enlarged gradually until k
nearest neighbors are found.
The PEB-tree augments the Bx-tree with privacy policy infor-
mation and hence has novel policy encoding and index key genera-
tion algorithms. Moreover, the PEB-tree’s query algorithm is more
complex than that of the Bx-tree because both privacy and location
proximity need to be considered simultaneously.
2.2 Location Anonymization
In provider-wise privacy, the service provider is typically pre-
vented from knowing a user’s exact location by using one or more
of the following techniques: k-anonymization [29], spatial-temporal
cloaking, and encryption. Gruteser et al. [10] are the first to ap-
ply k-anonymization to preserving location privacy and propose a
spatial-temporal cloaking approach: For each user, a trusted third
party (agent) generates a cloaking region in which at least k − 1
other users are also present. The service provider receives regions
instead of exact locations of users, and hence the service provider
cannot distinguish a user from other users in the same region. Var-
ious extensions [1, 8, 15, 19, 21] aim to improve service flexibility
and quality. A key limitation in these techniques is the performance
bottleneck caused by the single anonymization agent. Further, the
single agent can become a new target of attacks by malicious par-
ties.
Next, several encryption-based location anonymization approac-
hes [9, 14, 26] have been proposed. The most representative one
is by Ghinita et al. [9], who employ Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) to prevent service providers from knowing a user’s location
while providing a high quality of service.
Another thread of efforts [6, 12, 16] aims to perform location
anonymization at the user side. However, this approach requires
the users’ devices to perform substantial computations and require
extensive user involvement.
Despite extensive efforts on preserving provider-wise privacy,
little work has appeared on peer-wise privacy protection. In Sec-
tion 4, we cover two naive approaches to the indexing of moving
objects with peer-wise privacy protection.
2.3 Additional Related Techniques
Works on spatial-keyword querying (e.g., [4,17]) may seem sim-
ilar to our work since they also build an index for two aspects: lo-
cation proximity and text similarity. However, text similarity and
privacy policy compatibility are very different. In addition, we con-
sider moving objects, while spatial keyword querying indexes con-
sider stationary.
We use a simple format for location privacy policy specification,
which, however, contains the common major components of exist-
ing location privacy policy specifications [11, 23, 28]. Last, it is
worth noting that location privacy policies are different from the
concept of location-based access control, such as GEO-RBAC [5],
in the sense that location data plays different roles. In location-
based access control, location data serves as a condition that needs
to be verified before a user is granted a permission to particular re-
sources (e.g., classified documents), while location data is the data
to be protected by location privacy policies.
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION
As mentioned, we represent the position of a moving user as
a linear function from time to point locations in two-dimensional
Euclidean space. The model enables the answering of queries on
near future positions if needed, and the parameters needed for the
use of this model are readily available from GPS receivers,
Next, we assume users will predefine their location privacy poli-
cies and that the server has access to all users’ privacy policies. We
define a succinct yet expressive format for Location-Privacy Poli-
cies (LPP for short) as follows.
DEFINITION 1. Let u1 and u2 be two users. Let P1→2 denote
a location privacy policy assigned by u1 for u2. P1→2 consists of
three components 〈role, locr, tint〉 given as follows.
- role: the relationship between u1 and u2, such as “fam-
ily member,” “friend,” or “colleague.”
- locr: a spatial region.
- tint: a subset of the time domain.
A policy P1→2 = 〈role, locr, tint〉 states that if u2 is related to u1
by relationship role then u2 is allowed to see u1’s location when
u1 is located in locr during tint.
For example, Bob lets his colleagues see his location when he is
in town (e.g., Chicago) during work hours (e.g., 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.).
The corresponding LPP is: P = 〈colleague,Chicago, [8 a.m.,
5 p.m.]〉. This way, access to Bob’s location by users who are iden-
tified as colleagues by Bob is regulated by P . The use of the con-
cept of role is inspired by Role-based Access Control [7], which
avoids writing the same policy for multiple people with the same
relationship to Bob.
The specific design of the privacy policy format is orthogonal to
the paper’s contribution, which supports a range of spatio-temporal
policy formats.
We support privacy-aware counterparts of the two arguably most
fundamental query types, namely range queries and k nearest neigh-
bor queries. The formal definitions are given next.
DEFINITION 2. (PRQ) The privacy-aware range query is de-
fined as PRQ = (qID , R, tq), where qID is the query issuer’s
identity, R = ([xl1, xu1 ], [xl2, xu2 ]) (’l’ denotes ’lower bound’ and
’u’ denotes ’upper bound’), and tq is the query time. The query
retrieves all users who satisfy the following two conditions: (1) the
user’s location (x, y) at time tq falls within the query rectangle
R; (2) the user has a location privacy policy 〈role, locr, tint〉, in
which qID ∈ role , (x, y) ∈ locr , and tq ∈ tint.
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In Definition 2, the condition qID ∈ role checks if the relation-
ship between the query issuer and the user is defined in the user’s
location privacy policy.
DEFINITION 3. (PkNN) The privacy-aware k nearest neighbor
query is defined as PkNN = (qID , qLoc, k, tq), where qID is the
query issuer’s identity, qLoc and k nearest neighbor query param-
eters, and tq is the query time. The query retrieves k users in U for
which no other users are nearer to the query issuer’s location qLoc
at query time tq , where U is the set of all (m > k) users who have
a location privacy policy 〈role, locr, tint〉, where qID ∈ role, the
user’s location at time tq belongs to locr , and tq ∈ tint.
To illustrate the problem that we tackle, we use the running ex-
ample shown in Figure 3. The black point denotes a user with ID
u1 who wants to find her nearest friend. The star symbols represent
u1’s friends, whose IDs are u12, u30, u59, u100, and u130. White
circles represent other users. User u1’s friends may have differ-
ent location privacy policies. Suppose that at the time u1 issues
1
u12
u130
u
u
59
30
u100
u
Figure 3: Running Example
a privacy-aware nearest neighbor query, only one friend, i.e., u12
(highlighted by the solid star symbol), is willing to disclose their
location to u1. The query result is then {u12}.
4. SPATIAL INDEXING APPROACH
An existing approach [19] applies filtering to the result obtained
from using a spatial index. In particular, the service provider pro-
cesses the privacy-aware queries as were they normal spatial queries
and then evaluates the privacy policies on the returned results. With
this approach, many non-qualifying preliminary results may be re-
trieved from the spatial index.
A possible spatial index for the example scenario is given in Fig-
ure 4. Here, users are arranged purely based on their spatial prox-
imity. For instance, u1 and u100 are stored together as they are
close to one another.
To answer the privacy-aware nearest neighbor query from before,
the service provider first locates u1’s nearest neighbor u100 and
then evaluates u100’s privacy policy with respect to u1. Since u100
does not allow u1 to see his location at the query time, the service
provider has to look for other nearby users. The query then needs to
examine the next nearest neighbor, and this must be repeated until
the final answer u12 is found. In the example, at least four index
nodes are accessed.
u1
u59 u30... ...... ... ...
...
...
...
...
... ... ...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
u
Spatial Index
12 u130
u100
Figure 4: Spatial Index Example
5. POLICY-EMBEDDED BX-TREE
To efficiently support privacy-aware queries, we propose a three-
step approach. First, we develop a generic policy encoding tech-
nique that captures the compatibilities among location privacy poli-
cies belonging to different users. The encoded values are called se-
quence values. Second, we construct the Policy-Embedded Bx-tree
(PEB-tree) that indexes mobile users according to both spatial and
privacy policy proximity by carefully integrating sequence values
with location mapping values. Third, we propose efficient algo-
rithms for the queries defined in Section 3.
5.1 Location Privacy Policy Encoding
The actual policy encoding is preceded by policy translation and
policy comparison phases.
In policy translation, the semantic locations defined in an LPP
are mapped to Euclidean regions. In policy comparison, we use a
score α ∈ [0, 1] to quantify the relationships between two users u1
and u2. If no location privacy policy is defined between u1 and
u2, α = 0; otherwise, α is determined by the size of the region
and the duration of the time interval during which the two users al-
low each other to access their location information. If two policies
are incompatible, α = 0. As before, let P1→2 denote u1’s policy
regarding u2. We consider two cases.
• P1→2 ↔ P2→1: u1 and u2 are willing to simultaneously dis-
close their locations to each other under certain conditions.
Thus, overlaps exist between the locr and tint in the two
policies. Let O(locr1 , locr2) denote the area of the overlap
between the two regions and let D(tint1 , tint2) denote the
duration of the overlap between the time intervals in the two
policies. We define α for this case as follows, where the area
S of the space domain and the duration T of the time domain
are used for normalization.
α =
O(locr1 , locr2)
S
· D(tint1 , tint2)
T
• P1→2 = P2→1: u1 and u2 will not simultaneously disclose
their locations to one another. In this case, at least one of
locr and tint in the two policies do not intersect. The corre-
sponding α, which never exceeds 0.5, is defined as follows.
α =
1
2
(
|locr1 |
S
· |tint1 |
T
+
|locr2 |
S
· |tint2 |
T
)
The above function is also applied to the situation where
only one user has a policy regarding the other. For exam-
ple, if P2→1 does not exist, the second term in the definition
is omitted.
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It is worth noting that the above equations can be extended to
cover the case where multiple policies exist between two users.
Also, other policy comparison approaches may be adopted to com-
pute α values.
Based on the obtained α, we define the degree of compatibility
between two users’ policies, denoted as C(u1, u2).
C(u1, u2) =

1
2
(1 + α) P1→2 ↔P2→1
α P1→2 = P2→1
0 α = 0
(4)
The compatibility function C(·, ·) returns a value in [0, 1]. The
value is always greater than 0.5 for the first case, and it never ex-
ceeds 0.5 for the second case. The goal is to give higher priority
to users who can sometimes see each other simultaneously than
to users who always disclose their locations to one another under
disjoint conditions. This is because two users belonging to the first
case are more likely to be included in each other’s query results. We
call users with non-zero compatibility values related users. Other-
wise, they are called unrelated users.
The next step is to determine the order of the sequence value
assignment. We sort users in descending order of the number of
their related users. This order gives higher priority to larger groups
of users so as to preserve more relationships among users.
From the sorted list, we assign the first user, u1, a sequence value
SV (u1) = sv (sv > 1). Each user uj related to u1 obtains a se-
quence value SV (uj) = SV (u1)+(1−C(u1, uj)). This scheme
gives close sequence values to users with high compatibility values.
In what follows, only users who do not have a sequence value
are considered. In particular, we select from the sorted list the next
user u2 and assign it a sequence value SV (u2) = SV (u1) + δ,
where δ > 1. Parameter δ is an interval that helps separate different
groups of users as well as leaves adjustment space for future policy
updates. Then, each user uk related to u2 obtains a value SV (uk)=
SV (u2) + (1−C(u2, uk)). This process continues until all users
have sequence values. Policy updates are usually infrequent, and
hence policy encoding is conducted largely off-line and does not
add overhead at runtime.
Figure 5 outlines the algorithm of the sequence value assign-
ment. First (lines 1–5), for each user ui in U , we put the related
users (e.g., compatibility value C is larger than 0) in the group
Algorithm Sequence Value Assignment
Output: assignment result SV
1. for i← 1 to |U | do
// U is the list of all of users; U [i] = ui
2. G(ui)← ∅; SV (ui) ←⊥
3. for j ← 1 to |U | do
4. if C(ui, uj) > 0 then G(ui)← G(ui)⋃{uj}
5. Ul ← Sort(U , |G|, desc)
// list Ul contain users in descending order of |G|; Ul[i] = ui
6. SV (u1) ← sv
7. for k ← 1 to n
8. if SV (uk) =⊥ then
9. SV (uk)← SV (uk−1) + δ
10. for each uj in G(uk) do
11. if SV (uj) =⊥ then
12. SV (uj)← SV (uk) + (1− C(uk, uj))
13. return SV
Figure 5: Sequence Value Assignment
G(ui). Then we sort the users in descending order of their group
sizes and let ui be the i’th element of this list. After that, we start
assigning sequence values for each user (lines 6–12). If a user uk
has not been assigned a sequence value, the user obtains a sequence
value that is δ larger than that of its predecessor. Next, we assign
sequence values to all the group members of user uk. Each group
member without a sequence value obtains a sequence value equal
to the sum of user uk’s sequence value and the compatibility score
with user uk.
To illustrate the algorithm, we step through an example. Let 6
users u1, u2, ..., u6 be given. Let their compatibility values be:
C(u2, u1) = 0.4, C(u4, u1) = 0.9, C(u4, u3) = 0.8, C(u5, u3)
= 0.2, C(u6, u3) = 0.6. According to the number of related users,
we obtain this sorted list: (u3, u1, u4, u2, u5, u6). Let the initial
sequence value be 2 and also let δ = 2. We first assign u3 sequence
value 2. Its related users u4, u5, and u6 obtain the sequence values
2.2, 2.8, and 2.4, respectively. The next unassigned user is u1
whose sequence value is set as follows: CV (u1) = SV (u3) +
δ = 2 + 2 = 4. User u2 is currently unassigned and is related to
u1. Thus, SV (u2) = 4 + (1 − 0.4) = 4.6. This completes the
assignment.
5.2 Structure of the PEB-Tree
The PEB-tree is based on the Bx-tree [13], which in turn is based
on the B+-tree. This arrangement aims to make the PEB-tree easy
to implement in real database management systems that invariably
support B+-trees.
A leaf node in the PEB-tree has the following format:
〈PEB key ,UID, x, y, vx, vy , t, Pntp〉,
where PEB key is the index key, UID is the user ID, (x, y) and
(vx, vy) record the user’s location and velocity at time t, and Pntp
links to the user’s privacy policy set and other user-specific infor-
mation. The internal nodes of the PEB-tree serve as a directory that
contains index key values and pointers to child nodes.
The critical issue in building the PEB-tree is the generation of
the PEB key values for the users. A PEB key consists of three
components:(i) TID , which indicates the time partition in the PEB-
tree in which a user’s information is stored; (ii) ZV , which is the
Z-curve [22] value of a user’s location as of the time of the time
partition TID; and (iii) SV , which is the policy encoding detailed
in Section 5.1. The first two components are computed in a similar
way as in the Bx-tree [13]. After we obtain the three components,
we combine them as follows to form the PEB key .
PEB key = [TID ]2 ⊕ [SV ]2 ⊕ [ZV ]2 (5)
Here, [x]2 again denotes the binary value of x and ⊕ denotes con-
catenation. The construction of the PEB key gives higher priority
to sequence values than to location mapping values. This design is
attractive because users related to the query issuer are usually much
fewer than the unrelated users within the vicinity of a query. Us-
ing the PEB key , users who have policies related to one another
will tend to be stored close to each other, which reduces the cost of
processing privacy-aware queries.
The algorithms for insertion and deletion of objects in the PEB-
tree are similar to those for the B+-tree. Each insertion or deletion
requires only a single-path travel of the index, and the PEB-tree has
similarly efficient update performance as the B+-tree.
Figure 6 shows an expected PEB-tree that corresponds to the
example from Section 4. The figure suggests that the PEB-tree
arranges objects so that queries need fewer node accesses.
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Figure 6: PEB-Tree Example
5.3 Privacy-Aware Range Query
The privacy-aware range query (PRQ, defined in Section 3) aims
to find users who satisfy not only spatial constraints, but also policy
constraints. To answer such a query, we first determine the search
ranges for the two constraints separately and then combine them
to form ranges that can be represented by PEB key values. The
query algorithm consists of four steps.
The first step finds all users in the query range. Let Uloc de-
note the set of such users. The basic idea is similar to the range
query in the Bx-tree [13]. Specifically, in each time partition TID ,
the query range R is enlarged to cover users who are not in R as
of the time that they are indexed, but that may be in R as of the
query time. Then the enlarged query is converted into a set of
one-dimensional intervals that are the search ranges of consecu-
tive ZV values. Let there be k such intervals, given as follows:
{[ZVs1 ;ZVe1 ], . . . [ZVsk ;ZVek ]}.
The second step finds the set of users (called Upol) who may
allow the query issuer to see their locations at the query time. For
this purpose, we maintain a list for each user that stores the SV
values of users who have policies with respect to the list owner.
Such lists are updated only rarely, e.g., when a user is blocked by a
previous friend or when a user adds a new friend. We arrange the
users with policies with respect to the list owner in an ascending
order of their SV values and denote the minimum and maximum
SV values by SVmin and SVmax, respectively.
The third step computes the PEB key range corresponding to
the intersection of Uloc and Upol as obtained from the previous
steps. We first combine the starting and ending points of the ZV
ranges with each SV value, which yields these search ranges:
[SVmin ⊕ ZVs1 ;SVmin ⊕ ZVe1 ],
[SVmin ⊕ ZVs2 ;SVmin ⊕ ZVe2 ],
... ...,
[SVmax ⊕ ZVsk ;SVmax ⊕ ZVek ].
Then we convert theses into intervals of consecutive PEB key val-
ues by adding the TID of the time partition under consideration.
The PEB key ranges are used to retrieve the query results in
the PEB-tree. During the search, once a candidate user is found,
the remaining search intervals formed by this user’s SV value are
skipped. Each candidate user’s actual locations and policies are
evaluated. If a user is verified to be the final result, all the remaining
search intervals involving this user’s SV value are skipped.
Figure 7 summarizes the main steps of the range query algo-
rithm. At the beginning, we find the minimum and maximum se-
quence values in the query issuer’s friend list. We start considering
the first time partition in the PEB-tree by setting next timestamp
to 0. For each time partition, we enlarge the original query range
using the Enlarge() function. The obtained enlarged query win-
Algorithm PRQ (q, tq , uid, friend list)
Input: R is the query range and tq is the query time
uid is the ID of the user who issues the query
friend list is the list of users related to uid
Output: result list
1. SVmin ← smallest sequence value in friend list
2. SVmax ← largest sequence value in friend list
3. next timestamp← 0
4. more← true
5. while more
6. R′ ← Enlarge(next timestamp, R, tq)
7. ZV intervals← ZVconvert(R′)
8. for each (ZVstart;ZVend) in ZV intervals
9. StartPnt ← TID ⊕ SVmin ⊕ ZVstart
10. EndPnt ← TID ⊕ SVmax ⊕ ZVend
11. current leaf ← leaf node containing StartPnt
12. for each user u in current leaf do
13. if u passes location and policy evaluation then
14. add u to result list
15. if current leaf contains EndPnt then
16. next timestamp ← next timestamp + 1
17. else
18. current leaf←current leaf .right sibling
19. if next timestamp ≥ n ∨ current leaf =⊥ then
20. more← false
21.end while
22.return result list
Figure 7: Algorithm for the Privacy-Aware Range Query
dow R′ is converted into a set of 1-dimensional intervals by ZV-
convert() according to the Z-curve mapping. By concatenating the
TIDs (computed from next timestamp), the sequence values, and
the ZV values, we obtain the search range for the PEB key val-
ues which is [StartPnt ;EndPnt ]. Then we locate the leaf node
current leaf that contains the starting point of the search inter-
val, and we keep retrieving the right sibling nodes until the end of
the search interval. The search stops after all n time partitions are
checked.
Since the calculation of PEB key values uses interleaving algo-
rithms, it is possible that the PEB key intervals computed above
overlap with one another. To avoid duplicate search, the PEB key
intervals are refined into a set of non-overlapping intervals that are
then used for search in the PEB-tree.
We proceed to compute search ranges for the example in Fig-
ure 3. Assume that the dashed rectangle is the range querying for
user u1 to find his nearby friends, where the query range R =
([2, 2], [4, 6]). Suppose that the SV values of u1 and the friends
are the following: SV (u1) = 46, SV (u12) = 50, SV (u30) = 25,
SV (u59) = 89, SV (u100) = 55, SV (u130) = 80. For simplic-
ity, we assume that the space is 8×8. Then R is converted into
two one-dimensional intervals according to the Z-curve mapping:
[13; 16] and [25; 28]. Combining SV and ZV , we obtain 10 search
ranges for each TID . The following are the ranges for TID = 0:
• [TID ⊕ SV (u30)⊕ ZVs1 ;TID ⊕ SV (u30)⊕ ZVe1 ]
= [0⊕ 25⊕ 13; 0⊕ 25⊕ 16] = [1613, 1616]
• [TID ⊕ SV (u30)⊕ ZVs2 ;TID ⊕ SV (u30)⊕ ZVe2 ]
= [0⊕ 25⊕ 25; 0⊕ 25⊕ 28] = [1625, 1628]
• [TID ⊕ SV (u12)⊕ ZVs1 ;TID ⊕ SV (u12)⊕ ZVe1 ]
= [0⊕ 50⊕ 13; 0⊕ 50⊕ 16] = [3213, 3216]
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• [TID ⊕ SV (u12)⊕ ZVs1 ;TID ⊕ SV (u12)⊕ ZVe1 ]
= [0⊕ 50⊕ 25; 0⊕ 50⊕ 28] = [3225, 3228]
... ...
• [TID ⊕ SV (u59)⊕ ZVs1 ;TID ⊕ SV (u59)⊕ ZVe1 ]
= [0⊕ 89⊕ 25; 0⊕ 89⊕ 28] = [5725, 5728]
During the search of these ranges, once a user is found in the first
spatial range [13;16], the second range will be skipped since a user
has only one location.
5.4 Privacy-Aware kNN Query
The algorithm for the privacy-aware kNN (PkNN, defined in
Section 3) query is derived from the Bx-tree’s privacy-unaware
kNN query algorithm [13], which is answered by iteratively per-
forming range queries with an incrementally enlarged search region
until k answers are obtained. First, a range Rq1 centered at q and
with radius rq = Dk/k is constructed, where Dk is the estimated
distance between the query issuer and its k’th nearest neighbor; Dk
can be estimated by the following equation, where N is the total
number of users [33]:
Dk =
2√
pi
[
1−
√
1−
(
k
N
) 1
2
]
Since a user location that is inserted at a certain time is stored
in the index as of a future label timestamp, Rq1 is enlarged to R′q1
similarly to what we did for range queries to cover all users who
may be in Rq1 as of the query time. If at least k users are cur-
rently covered by the inscribed circle of R′q1 at time tq, the kNN
algorithm returns k users and stops.
Otherwise, Rq1 is extended by rq to obtain Rq2 and the corre-
sponding enlarged window R′q2. This time, the region R′q2 − R′q1
is searched. The process is repeated until k users are found within
the inscribed circle of the current range. During the search, the
corresponding two-dimensional ranges are converted into a set of
intervals in the transformed, one-dimensional space.
To answer the PkNN query, we need to consider the search ranges
of both the ZV and the SV values for each time partition TID .
The ZV ranges determine the locations of the users who are close
to the query issuer, which can be obtained by the general approach
already covered, but with the following modification. For each
query range, we consider only the one interval formed by the min-
imum and maximum 1-dimensional values of the query range.
The reason for this difference is the following. The PkNN query
requires multiple rounds of range queries, and the corresponding 1-
dimensional query intervals obtained from different rounds of en-
largement may intersect. When we actually search those intervals
in the index, it is possible that multiple query intervals are located
in the same leaf node.
To avoid complex interval calculations and repeated leaf node
accesses, we use a single query interval for each range query. Sup-
pose that n rounds of enlargement occur. For round i (i.e., R′qi),
we denote the starting and ending points of the set of correspond-
ing one-dimensional search intervals by ZVsi and ZVei , respec-
tively. The ranges of n rounds are given by: {[ZVs1 ;ZVe1 ], . . . ,
[ZVsn ;ZVen ]}.
The SV ranges retrieve users who may be willing to disclose
their locations to the query issuer. A smaller SV value indicates
that the corresponding user is more likely to disclose their loca-
tion to the query issuer. Suppose that m users are willing to let
the query issuer see their locations under some conditions. By ar-
ranging these m users in increasing order of their sequence val-
ues, we have the following list: [SV (u1), SV (u2), ..., SV (um)],
[m
1 ZVs1[ ZVe1
ZVs1 ZVe1
s1ZV
1SV(u ) ZVe2ZVs2 ];[
ZVe2ZVs22SV(u )
e2s2ZVmSV(u  )
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Figure 8: Search Matrix
where SV (ui) is the sequence value of user ui.
Figure 8 shows the complete search space (represented as a ma-
trix) in one time partition for a given PkNN query. The actual
search is based on the values of the PEB key computed from the
ZV and SV ranges in each element of the matrix together with the
TID of the corresponding time partition.
The next step is to find a good search order to obtain the query re-
sult as soon as possible. Observe that ranges close to the upper-left
corner of the matrix have shorter spatial distances to or closer SV
value differences from the query issuer. Therefore, those ranges
are more likely to contain the final query results. Therefore, we
apply a triangular search order as illustrated in Figure 9, where the
arrows and numbers in the brackets define the search order. Fol-
lowing this order, the ZV and SV values are changed alternatively
until k candidates are found.
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Figure 9: Triangular Search Order
Having found k candidates, we check the remaining ranges in
the last visited column in the search matrix, i.e., a vertical scan is
done for the last visited column. For this vertical scan, the intervals
of the ZV values in the remaining ranges are shortened according
to the distance to the latest k’th nearest candidate.
For example, if k candidates are found after examining the users
falling in the range indicated by the circle 5 (in the second column
in Figure 9), we continue to consider the remaining ranges in the
second column, which are: [SV (u2)⊕ [ZVs2;ZVe2], . . . , SVm ⊕
[ZVs2;ZVe2]. The interval of the ZV values is a subset of [ZVs2;
ZVe2].
In particular, the new interval corresponds to the query square
with the query issuer at the center and twice the distance to the
k’th nearest candidate as its side length. This last step is needed in
order to determine whether there are other users who have not been
examined, but are closer to the query issuer than the k’th nearest
neighbor found so far.
Figure 10 outlines the algorithm of the PkNN queries. First, we
compute the estimated distance between the query issuer and the
k’th nearest neighbor, based on which we obtain the initial query
radius. The search starts from the first time partition in the PEB-
tree, i.e., next timestamp = 0. In each time partition, the Get-
Range() function constructs the search range which is a square cen-
tered at (x, y) with length equal to 2rq . According to the search or-
der adopted, the Next friend() and Next radius() functions compute
the corresponding SV value and radius of the query range, respec-
tively. Theses parameters are then supplied to the PRQ query mod-
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Algorithm PKNN(x, y, tq, k, uid , friend list)
Input: (x, y) is user uid ’s location
k is the required number of neighbors
tq is the query time
friend list is the list of users related to uid
Output: result list
1. Dk ← 2/sqrt(3.14) × (1- sqrt(1- sqrt(k/N)))
2. rq ← Dk/k
3. next timestamp ← 0
4. more ← true
5. while more
6. R← GetRange((x, y), rq)
7. fid ← Next friend(friend list)
8. neighbor ←PRQ(R, tq, uid , fid )
9. result list←Add to result(neighbor)
10. if k neighbors are found
11. fid ← Rest friend(friend list)
12. R← GetRange((x, y), kdist )
13. neighbor ← PRQ(R, tq, uid ,fid )
14. result list←Add to result(neighbor )
15. more ← false
16. rq ← Next radius()
17. return result list
Figure 10: Algorithm for the PkNN Query
ule (presented in the previous section) to retrieve candidate query
results.
The Add to result() function will verify the actual locations and
policy constraints of the obtained results. If k neighbors are found,
the query range will be refined based on the distance between the
query issuer and the k’th nearest neighbor found so far, and the
range of the sequence value is refined by the Rest friend() function
that returns the list of SV values in the last visited column in the
search matrix. After refinement, another PRQ query is invoked
to obtain the final query result. In case less than k neighbors are
found, the query radius is enlarged to start a new round of search.
6. QUERY I/O COST MODELING
In this section, we model the I/O cost of querying with the PEB-
tree. We consider the privacy-aware range query as it is the most
fundamental query.
The cost function we develop is based on the following assump-
tions on the datasets. To simulate different relationships among
users, we first randomly divide users into groups and then gener-
ate policies for each user based on a parameter called the grouping
factor (θ) and defined as θ = Ngr
Np
, where Ngr is the number of
policies that a user has regarding other users in the same group,
and where Np is the user’s total number of policies. The group-
ing factor ranges from 0 to 1. When the factor is 1, each user only
has policies with users in the same group, and no policies connect
users in different groups. When the factor is 0, there is no group,
and each user may have policies with respect to any user in the
system.
Our approach is to identify important parameters that signifi-
cantly affect query performance and then integrate their effects into
a cost function. Recall that the index keys in the PEB-tree are gen-
erated by incorporating the effects of policy compatibility and lo-
cation proximity. Moreover, the policy compatibility is represented
as a sequence value to which the location encoding is appended.
As a result, the sequence value becomes the dominant factor dur-
ing querying, while the location encoding provides only supple-
mentary pruning. Thus, the cost function focuses on modeling the
effect of the sequence value assignment on the query performance.
An empirical validation (in Section 7.10) offers evidence that the
approach yields a quite accurate cost function.
The sequence value assignment is determined by the grouping
factor θ, the number of policies per user (denoted as Np), and the
total number of users (denoted as N ). When θ = 1, the PEB-
tree achieves the best performance. This is because when users are
well grouped, query results are constrained to users that are stored
together. The query cost increases when θ decreases. The worst-
case scenario occurs when each user is allowed to have a policy
with any other user in the system, i.e., θ = 0. In this case, the
sequence values fail to group users, as there are no groups. The I/O
cost of a query is upper-bounded by the number of users related
to the query issuer when each of the related users is stored in a
different leaf node.
The above effect is modeled by the cost function C1 in Equa-
tion 6, where Nl is the total number of leaf nodes in the index; Np
is the query cost in the above-mentioned worst-case scenario; and
Nθp estimates the benefit obtained from grouping and captured by
the grouping factor. The term 1 captures the minimum query cost
when the query result is stored in one leaf node.
C1 =
{
1 +Np −Nθp Np ≤ Nl
1 +Nl −Nθp Np > Nl (6)
In summary, C1 estimates the number of nodes needed for storing
users related to the query issuer by taking into account Np and θ.
Next, we consider the effect of the parameter N . A larger N
leads to larger groups of users being connected through policies.
Since the sequence value assignment is conducted group-by-group
in descending order of the group size, the existence of many larger
groups tends to increase the distance among the sequence values
belonging to two related users. In other words, it increases the
probability that users in the same query result are stored in different
nodes, which in turn increases the query cost.
The empirical studies covered in the next section show that the
query cost increases linearly with N . Therefore, we model it as a
linear function and integrate it into C1 as follows.
C =
{
1 + (a1
N
L2
+ a2)(Np −Nθp ) Np ≤ Nl
1 + (a1
N
L2
+ a2)(Nl −Nθp ) Np > Nl (7)
In Equation 7, L is the side length of the space and N
L2
is then the
density of the object space. Parameters a1 and a2 are obtained by
taking as input any two sample points (i.e., the query cost C) from
the experiments on the datasets with the same location distribution.
For example, a1 = 10 and a2 = 0.3, for data sets with uniform
location distribution.
Using the cost function, we are interested in understanding the
extents of the ranges of settings within which the PEB-tree is com-
petitive. Specifically, we find that the PEB-tree performs worse
than the spatial index approach described in Section 4 when each
user is related to more than about 5% of all users. Considering
a data set with 100K users, 5% is 5,000, which is already a large
number of friends for a person.
Such a worst-case scenario may not occur in reality, as little pri-
vacy is actually achieved in such scenario. If all users are related
to each other, every user grants some access to everyone else in the
system. We believe that the general settings used in the empirical
studies covered next, in which users tend to show certain privacy
preference to a group of users, make more sense.
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7. EMPIRICAL PERFORMANCE STUDY
Following a description of the settings of the study, we cover
the offline cost of the initial index building. Then follows query
performance studies where a range of workload settings are varied.
We end with a cost model validation study.
7.1 Experimental Settings
We compare the performance of the PEB-tree with the approach
of using spatial index as introduced in Section 4. Specifically,
we select the Bx-tree [13] as the spatial index, and we adopt the
commonly used filtering approach to handle peer-wise privacy con-
cerns. Since the PEB-tree is based on the Bx-tree and the spatial
indexing approach is based on the Bx-tree, the same settings from
the literature [13], such as the number of tree partitions and the
maximum update interval, are used for the two approaches.
We use two types of synthetic data sets of user positions, namely
uniformly distributed positions and positions distributed in a spa-
tial network, both in a space domain with area 1000 × 1000. In
the uniform datasets, user positions are chosen randomly, and they
move in randomly chosen directions and at speeds ranging from 0
to 3. One may think of the unit of space as being kilometers and
the unit of speed as being kilometers per minute.
The network-based data sets are generated using an existing data
generator [27], where users move in a network of two-way routes
that connect a varying number of destinations. Objects start at ran-
dom positions on routes and are assigned at random to one of three
groups of objects with maximum speeds of 0.75, 1.5, and 3. When-
ever an object reaches one of the destinations, it chooses the next
target destination at random. Objects accelerate as they leave a des-
tination, and they decelerate as they approach a destination.
In all datasets, for each user, we generate a given number of ran-
dom policies by varying the spatial ranges and time intervals with
respect to a set of other users. The relationships among users are
modeled using the grouping factor introduced in Section 6. Unless
stated otherwise, the dataset contains 60,000 uniformly distributed
users, and each has 50 policies with a grouping factor of 0.7.
The default query window is quadratic with side length 200, and
k is 5 in the PkNN query. The parameters used are summarized in
Table 1, where values in bold denote default values used.
The performance is evaluated in terms of I/O cost. The disk page
size is set at 4K bytes, and a 50-page LRU buffer is simulated.
We report only query performance as the two approaches achieve
similarly good update performance.
Table 1: Parameters and Their Settings
Parameter Setting
Buffer 50 pages
Number of users 10K, 20K, . . . , 60K, . . . , 100K
Maximum speed 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Query window size 100, 200, . . . , 1000
k (kNN query) 1, . . . , 5, . . . , 10
Grouping factor (θ) 0 (uniform), . . . , 0.7, . . . , 1.0
Number of policies per user 10, . . . , 50, . . . , 100
Number of destinations uniform, 25, 50, 100, . . . , 500
7.2 Preprocessing Time for Policy Encoding
In the first round of experiments, we study the preprocessing
time used for policy encoding. This one-time processing is done
offline when users are first registered.
Figure 11(a) shows the results when varying the total number of
users from 10K to 100K. The experiments were conducted on a PC
with a 2.53GHz Intel Xeon CPU and 4 Gbytes of memory. The time
increases linearly with the number of users. We also observe that
the preprocessing is very efficient, as it takes only about 10 seconds
to compare location privacy policies and generate sequence values
for 100K users.
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Figure 11: Preprocessing Time
We also consider the policy encoding time when varying the
number of policies to be analyzed for each user from 10 to 100,
with 60K users. As shown in Figure 11(b), the processing time in-
creases with the number of policies, but is still low. The efficient
preprocessing can be attributed to our algorithm that uses the addi-
tion operation to directly generate sequence values related to a user
instead of sorting compatibility degrees multiple times.
7.3 Effect of Total Number of Users
We proceed to evaluate the query performance of the PEB-tree
and the spatial index approach. In this experiment, we vary the total
number of users from 10K to 100K, and we measure the average
I/O cost of 200 queries.
Figure 12(a) reports on privacy-aware range queries. We ob-
serve that the PEB-tree yields much less I/O than the spatial in-
dex. The performance gap increases with the data size. When the
data size grows to 100K, the PEB-tree is about 10 times better than
the spatial index. This behavior can be explained as follows. The
(a) PRQ (b) PkNN
Figure 12: Effect of Total Number of Users
spatial index organizes users only based on their spatial proximity.
Thus, the spatial index needs to retrieve all users inside the query
range, regardless of whether or not they are allowed to be seen by
the query issuer, which increases costs. The PEB-tree stores users
based on both location and policy proximity, and search is narrowed
by using both location and policy constraints; hence it achieves the
better performance.
Figure 12(b) shows the performance of PkNN queries. Again,
the PEB-tree significantly outperforms the spatial index approach.
As for range queries, this demonstrates that the PEB-tree provides
a better storage arrangement by considering both location and pol-
icy proximity, which in turn reduces unnecessary accesses to non-
qualifying users.
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The triangular search order, which examines users in descending
order of their probabilities to be included in the query result, also
improves performance. In other words, users who are either close
to the query issuer or are more likely to be visible to the query
issuer are checked early, which directs the search towards users
who qualify for the result and shortens the query processing.
7.4 Effect of Number of Policies Per User
In this experiment, we vary the number of policies per user from
10 to 100. Without loss of generality, we assume that each user has
only one location privacy policy with respect to a particular user.
Figure 13(a) shows the performance of privacy-aware range quer-
ies, from which we can see that the PEB-tree again outperforms the
spatial index. Moreover, it is not surprising to observe an increase
(a) PRQ (b) PkNN
Figure 13: Effect of Number of Policies per User
of the query cost in the PEB-tree with the number of policies. The
more policies, the more qualified users may be included in a query
result, and therefore more nodes are accessed. We also observe that
the performance of the spatial index is independent of the number
of policies. This is because the spatial index considers only loca-
tion proximity. Thus, queries with the same location constraint will
cause the same number of candidate users to be retrieved.
Figure 13(b) compares the PkNN query performance of the two
approaches. Observe that the PEB-tree saves significant I/O com-
pared to the spatial index. The reason is similar to that discussed
for the previous experiments.
7.5 Effect of Grouping Factor
Here, we investigate the effect of the grouping factor. As men-
tioned earlier, when this factor is 0, each user can have policies with
randomly selected users in the system. When it is 1, each user is
only related to users in the same group.
We first evaluate the range query performance. As shown in Fig-
ure 14(a), we can see that the cost of the PEB-tree tends to de-
crease as the grouping factor increases, whereas the spatial index
maintains a constant performance. The experiment confirms the
(a) PRQ (b) PkNN
Figure 14: Effect of the Grouping Factor
expectation that larger grouping factors help the PEB-tree achieve
more effective sequence value assignments that group related users
better. As the grouping factor approaches 1, users tend to be di-
vided into non-overlapping groups. In this case, users in the same
group are likely stored in the same or in a few nearby leaf nodes in
the PEB-tree, and therefore few I/Os are needed for queries.
However, the grouping factor does not influence the query per-
formance of the spatial index since it stores users purely based on
their location proximity, which is not influenced by the grouping
factor.
Similar performance patterns are observed for PkNN queries, as
shown in Figure 14(b). The PEB-tree performs the best for the
same reasons.
7.6 Effect of Query Parameters
We now evaluate the impact of the location-related query param-
eters. For range queries, we measure the query cost by varying the
query window side length from 100 to 1,000. For kNN queries, we
vary parameter k from 1 to 10.
Figure 15(a) shows the PRQ performance. Again, the PEB-tree
(a) PRQ (b) PkNN
Figure 15: Varying Query Parameters
significantly and consistently outperforms the spatial index. More-
over, the PEB-tree cost is almost constant, while the spatial in-
dex cost increases as the query window increases. The PEB-tree
achieves constant performance because no matter how large the
query window is, the maximum number of users to be checked by
the PEB-tree is bounded by the total number of users related to the
query issuer.
For the spatial index, the location-related query parameters play
an important role. In particular, the larger the query window, the
more nodes need to be accessed in the spatial index.
Figure 15 (b) shows the PkNN query performance of the two
trees when varying k. The PEB-tree has stable performance for
different values of k due to the reasons similar to those stated for
the last experiment. This also indicates that the PEB-tree is rela-
tively unaffected by the location-related parameters. In the case of
the spatial index, increasing the value of k slightly degrades query
performance since a larger k requires the spatial index to enlarge
the search range to find the qualified objects.
7.7 Effect of Spatial Distribution
This round of experiments targets the effect of the location dis-
tribution of the users. We observe the performance of range and
nearest neighbor queries when using network-based data sets with
the number of possible destinations (also called hubs) ranging from
25 to 500. The fewer the destinations, the more spatially skewed
the data is.
Figure 16 shows that the PEB-tree achieves much better per-
formance than the spatial index in all cases. The increase in the
number of destinations only slightly affects the search ranges in
the PEB-tree. This is because the location constraints are not the
dominant factor during the index construction and hence has less
influence on the query performance. The performance of the spa-
46
(a) PRQ (b) PkNN
Figure 16: PEB-Tree vs. Spatial Index
tial index approach fluctuates slightly when varying the number of
possible destinations.
7.8 Effect of Object Speed
We are also interested in studying how the object speed affects
the query performance of both approaches. We vary the maximum
speed from 1 to 6, choosing object speeds in the range from 0 to the
maximum speed at random. As shown in Figure 17, the query cost
of the spatial index increases slightly when objects move faster for
both types of queries. This is because the query algorithm of spatial
(a) PRQ (b) PkNN
Figure 17: Effect of Object Speed
index needs to enlarge the query window according to the maxi-
mum object speed. The higher the speed, the larger the final search
region becomes, yielding a higher cost. Compared to the spatial in-
dex, the PEB-tree has relatively stable performance. Although the
PEB-tree shares the query window enlargement problem with the
spatial index approach, the location constraints used in the PEB-
tree are dominated by the policy compatibility, which significantly
reduces the effect of this location-related parameter.
7.9 Effect of Updates
To observe the effect of updates on query performance, we mea-
sure the query costs if both approaches each time 25% of the data
set has been updated. The experiments are conducted until the data
set has been fully updated twice. The results, in Figure 18, show
that the query cost of both approaches only fluctuates slightly. This
(a) PRQ (b) PkNN
Figure 18: Effect of Updates
is because the two indexes share the same base structure, i.e., the
Bx-tree. The fluctuations are mainly caused by the amount of ob-
jects belonging to different time partitions in the trees.
7.10 Cost Function Evaluation
We end by evaluating the accuracy of the cost function C de-
veloped in Section 6. We compare the I/O cost as obtained from
the cost function C with the actual I/O cost. The comparison is
conducted by varying one of three parameters at a time: the total
number of users, the number of policies per user, and the group-
ing factor. We consider these three parameters because they are the
main factors that affect the query performance of the PEB-tree, as
shown in the previous experiments. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 19. From all the figures, we can see that the estimated cost
tracks the actual cost quite well.
Figure 19: Cost Function Evaluation
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We consider the problem of efficiently supporting range and k
nearest neighbor queries in a setting that affords moving users of
location-based services peer-wise location privacy. Specifically,
different peer users are allowed to see the location of a user when
the user is within a specified spatio-temporal range.
To support the resulting privacy-aware queries, we present a new
indexing technique, called the PEB-tree, that leverages the Bx-tree
that is based on the B+-tree. This is enabled by a technique that en-
codes both the location privacy compatibility and the spatial prox-
imity among users in a one-dimensional value that is amenable to
B+-tree indexing; thus, users who tend to be allowed to see each
others’ locations and who are spatially close tend to be stored to-
gether on disk. Range and k nearest neighbor query algorithms are
presented that exploit the PEB-tree to simultaneously filter candi-
date users according to both privacy compatibility and spatial prox-
imity.
An empirical performance study compares the proposed tech-
niques with an existing approach that uses simply a spatial index,
and the study offers insight into the behavior of the proposed tech-
niques for wide variety of workloads. The study shows that the
proposals outperform the existing approach very substantially.
Several directions for future research exist. It is relevant to con-
sider multiple policies between two users for computing policy
compatibility degree. Similarly, it is relevant to explore new en-
coding and accompanying querying techniques. Moreover, it is of
47
interest to extend other types of location-based queries to take into
account peer-wise privacy concerns.
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